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BORROWING FROM PETER To PAY PAUL: A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF COLORADO'S DEFERRED DEPOSIT LOAN ACT
PAUL CHESSINt
ABSTRACT

On July 1, 2000, Colorado'sDeferredDepositLoan Act (DDLA) became
effective. This law regulates a small, short-term, high-costform of consumer loan commonly called a "'payday"loan. With the DDLA 's enactment, the office of the Administrator of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, the state agency with regulatory oversight of the payday loan industry in Colorado, began collecting and studying datafrom Colorado
payday lenders concerning their loans and the consumers who obtain
them. This article reports on the results of that study. It (1) briefly explainspayday loan mechanics and its origins; (2) discusses the advent of
modern payday lending, including initialregulation and the events surrounding the DDLA's enactment; (3) examines the growth of and
changes in the payday lending industry in Colorado; (4) turns to the
study itself, including statistical analyses of consumer demographics,
loan terms and finance charges, and consumers' utilization of payday
loans and relationship of such utilization to lenders' revenues; and (5)
offers some suggested changes to the DDLA.
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INTRODUCTION

On April 18, 2000, Colorado Gov. Bill Owens signed into law Senate Bill (SB) 00-144, the Deferred Deposit Loan Act (DDLA). This act,
codified as Article 3.1 of Colorado's Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
§§ 5-1-101, et seq., C.R.S. 2004 (Code), regulates a small, short-term,
high-cost form of consumer loan called a "deferred deposit loan"', also
commonly called a "postdated check" or "payday" loan.2
Since the DDLA's enactment, the office of the Administrator of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code 3 has been collecting and studying data
from Colorado payday lenders concerning their loans and the consumers
who obtain them. This article reports on the results of that study, representing the first four and one-half years of experience under the DDLA.
From this, it is hoped that policy makers, regulators, and others can determine whether the DDLA is fulfilling its purposes and meeting Colorado consumers' needs.
I first present a brief primer on the mechanics of payday lending
(Part I) and its history (Part II). I then discuss the advent of modern payday lending in Colorado and initial attempts to regulate it (Part III), providing the historical context for the Code's 2000 revision and passage of
SB 00-144 (Part IV). After examining the growth of and changes in the
payday lending industry in Colorado (Part V), I turn to the Administrator's study (Part VI). I explain the study and its methodology and then
present its results. These results include statistical analyses of consumer
demographics, loan terms and finance charges, and consumers' utilization of payday loans and relationship of such utilization to lenders' revenues. Finally, based on my observations from these results, I offer some
1. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-102(3) (2005).
2.
See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1, 9, 9 n.34 (2002); JEAN ANN FOX, THE GROWTH OF LEGAL LOAN SHARKING: A
REPORT
ON
THE
PAYDAY
LOAN
INDUSTRY
1
(1998),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/The_Growth-of LegalLoanSharking_1998.pdf (listing various
names for payday loans).
3.
The Administrator is the administrative agency vested with regulatory authority to enforce
compliance with the Code, including the DDLA. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-6-104 (2005). See
generally COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-6-101 to -116 (2005). The Administrator is appointed by the
Attorney General and the agency is created and exists within the Department of Law. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 5-6-103 (2005).
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suggested changes to the DDLA to correct deficiencies arising from its
current structure (Part VII).
I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON PAYDAY LENDING
First, what, exactly, is a payday loan? This type of loan is a small,
single-advance, single-payment, short-term, and high-cost loan. As described by the Federal Reserve Board, a payday loan is a credit transaction
in which a cash advance is made to a consumer in exchange for the
consumer's personal check, or in exchange for the consumer's authorization to debit the consumer's deposit account, and where the
parties agree either that the check will not be cashed or deposited, or
that the consumer's
deposit account will not be debited, until a desig4
nated future date.
The DDLA similarly defines a "deferred deposit loan" as a consumer loan in which the lender advances money to the borrower and in
return accepts from the consumer an "instrument," such as a check or
authorization to debit the consumer's bank account, in the amount of the
advance plus allowable finance charges.5 The lender agrees not to cash
the check or debit the account for the term of the loan.6
The DDLA limits the principal amount of the loan to no more than
$500. 7 The term of the loan may not exceed forty days.8 The DDLA
allows the lender to charge a maximum finance charge of up to 20% of
the first $300 of principal, and up to 7.5% of any principal amount in
excess of $300.9 Thus, the maximum allowable DDLA finance charge
for a maximum loan amount of $500 is $75. The "cost" of a typical
$300, two-week loan with a DDLA finance charge of $60, expressed as
an "annual percentage rate" (APR), is slightly over 520%.' 0 See Table 1.
At the end of the loan's term, i.e., when repayment of the loan, including both principal and finance charge, is due, the consumer may pay

4.
12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. I § 226.2(a)(14)(2) (2005). 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 is Federal Reserve
Board Regulation Z (Reg. Z), the primary regulation implementing the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (2005). See 12 C.F.R. §226.1(a) (2005). Supplement I to Reg. Z
is the Federal Reserve Board's Official Staff Commentary (OSC), which is the vehicle by which the
Federal Reserve Board's staff issues interpretations of TILA and Reg. Z. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226,
supp. I § 1 (2005) [hereinafter Supplement I].
5.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-102(3), (4) (2005) (defining "deferred deposit loan" and
"instrument," respectively).
6.
See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.1-102(3)(b), 103 (2005).
7.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-106(1) (2005).
8.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-103 (2005).
9. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-105 (2005).
10.
The DDLA requires the same loan disclosures as is required with any other consumer loan
under the Code, TILA, and Reg. Z. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-103 (2005).
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Table 1: The "Cost" of a Typical Two-Week Loan (*Based Upon a
Fourteen-Day Loan Term)
Amount Financed ($) Maximum Allowable
AmountFinanced ($) _ Finance
Charge($)

100
200
300
400
500

20
40
60
67.5
75

APR

APR_(%)*

521.43
521.43
521.43
439.96
391.07

this amount to the lender and redeem the instrument, or the lender may
negotiate the instrument. 1
Alternatively, the consumer may "renew" the loan for an additional
period of time by paying another DDLA finance charge.1 2 Typically,
both the finance charge for and loan term of the renewed loan are the
same as with the original loan. For example, let us take a fourteen-day,
$300 loan with a $60 finance charge. On day fourteen - the loan's due
date - the lender typically will allow the consumer to renew the loan for
an additional fourteen days by paying the $60 finance charge, with another $60 finance charge due at the end of the second fourteen-day term.
11.
See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.1-103, 108(3), 111 (2005). For other descriptions of payday
loan mechanics, see, for example, Ex parte Speedee Cash of Ala., Inc., 806 So. 2d 389, 390 (Ala.
2001) (describing payday loans as loans where, in return for a cash advance, the borrower gives a
check to the lender in the amount of the advance plus an additional charge, and the lender agrees not
to deposit the check until some later date, at which time either the borrower may redeem the check
by paying its face amount or the lender presents the check for payment). See also Charles A. Bruch,
Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest
Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1258 (2001); Lisa Blaylock Moss,
Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions & the Need for Regulation, 51
ALA. L. REv. 1725, 1728-30 (2000); Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer FinancialServices Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current
Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REv. 589, 600-605 (2000);
Scott A. Schaaf, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C.
BANKING INST. 339, 341-342 (2001); ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, THE COST OF
CREDIT: REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND INDUSTRY ABUSES § 7.5.5 (3d ed. 2005); Fox, supra note

2, at 1-2.
12. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(2) (2005). "Renewals" are also commonly called
"rollovers" or "refinances." See, e.g., Schaaf, supra note 11, at 342 (using the term "rollovers");
LAURA E. UDIS, REPORT OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE REVISION COMMITTEE AND
ACTIONS OF THE COLORADO COMMISSION ON CONSUMER CREDIT 23-24 (1999) [hereinafter
REPORT OF THE UCCC] (using the term "refinances"). However, the term "rollover" also refers to
the practice, discussed infra Part VIE, whereby a consumer pays cash to pay off a loan in full on its
due date, but then immediately receives a new loan, typically for the same amount and for a similar
term. See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(3) (2005) (indicating that once the consumer completes the transaction by paying off the first loan, the consumer may enter into a new loan). Although not a true "renewal" in the DDLA refinance sense of the term, the net economic effect to the
consumer of this latter type of "rollover" is the same as a renewal - for the net payment of the first
loan's finance charge, the consumer extends the payment of the principal amount for another term.
See infra Part VI.E. So as to avoid confusion, I limit my use of the term "renewal" to its statutory
definition in COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-3.1-108; I use the term "rollover" to refer generically to loan
"extensions" in manners other than true DDLA renewals.
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Then, on day twenty-eight, the renewed loan's due date, the consumer
may pay the loan off in full by paying $360, i.e., the $300 principal plus
the second $60 finance charge.
The DDLA prohibits a lender from renewing a payday loan at the
high DDLA finance charge rate more than once. 13 At the end of the renewal term, either (1) the consumer must pay the loan in full (whether by
paying cash to redeem the instrument or through the lender's negotiating
the instrument)14 ; or (2) the lender may refinance the loan as a regular
supervised loan under the Code at rates applicable to such loans.' 5
Although the DDLA limits to one the number of renewals, it does16
not contain any limits as to the number of times a lender may "rollover"'
the loan by extending a new loan to the consumer immediately after the
consumer pays off the prior loan. To illustrate using the prior example,
on day twenty-eight, the consumer pays off the renewed loan by paying
the lender $360. Immediately, the lender extends to the consumer a new
$300, fourteen-day loan, with a $60 finance charge. These types of
"rollover" transactions are variously called "touch and go," "back-toadvance," "same day buy-backs," or "same day as
back," "same-day
17
payoff.'

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PAYDAY LENDING
Payday lending is not new. Rather, it is merely a recent incarnation
of a form of credit transaction that has existed for over a hundred years.
Its roots are directly traceable to the "wage assignment," "salary buying,"
or "salary lending" transactions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.18 In these types of transactions, a lender would "buy" at a disSee COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(1) (2005).
13.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(3) (2005).
14.
15.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(4) (2005). A "supervised loan" is a consumer loan
with an APR in excess of 12%. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-1-301(47) (2005). The Code generally
limits non-DDLA supervised loan interest rates to no more than 36% APR, but allows alternative
finance charges for certain small installment loans. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-2-201(2), 214
(2005).

16.
17.

See supra note 12 (describing "rollovers").
See, e.g., Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 601 (discussing "touch and go" transac-

tions); JEAN ANN FOX & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING: How BANKS
(2001),
15
PROTECTIONS
CONSUMER
EVADE
STATE
LENDERS
PAYDAY
HELP
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/paydayreport.pdf (discussing "touch and go" transactions); Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 156 (2004) (discussing "same-day advance" transactions); KEITH ERNST ET AL., QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY
PAYDAY LENDING 3-4 (2003), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudy
121803.pdf (discussing "back-to-back" transactions).
See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 618-20 (describing wage assignment transac18.
tions); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 2.5, at 39, § 7.5.5.1, at 292 (observing that the market
for small, short-term loans has come full circle from turn-of-the-century "salary lenders" to presentday payday lenders). See also Bruch, supra note 11, at 1267-68, 1270 (tracing history of payday
loans); Moss, supra note 11, at 1731 (describing payday lending as a "modem day version of consumer abuses practiced at the beginning of the Twentieth Century"). A recent paper traces payday
lending's roots to several thousand years ago. See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson,
Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and Geography of "Payday" Loans in Military

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 83:2

count the borrower's next expected wage payment. For example, a
lender would pay a borrower $20 in return for receiving the borrower's
$24 wage payment due two weeks later.' 9 Lenders claimed that these
types of transactions were not loans and therefore not subject to applicable usury laws. 20 However, the courts had no trouble piercing the lenders' veils of form and routinely held these transactions were loans and
the lenders' schemes merely devices to conceal usury.2 '
III. THE EMERGENCE OF PAYDAY LENDING IN COLORADO AND EARLY
REGULATION

Modem payday lending emerged in the early 1990s. 22 In Colorado,
it commenced formally in June 1992. Some time prior to then, the Administrator became aware of what were then being called "deferred presentment" check cashing transactions.2 3 Check cashers, who typically
cash third-party checks for consumers for a fee, 24 started offering to consumers a different type of "check cashing" transaction. In these transactions, the check casher advanced money to the consumer in exchange for
receiving the consumer's personal check in the amount of the advance
plus an additional sum. Often, the consumer's check was post-dated;
regardless, the check casher agreed to defer presentment of the check for
a period of time, typically two weeks, after the advance. In Administrative Interpretation No. 3.104-9201,25 the Administrator concluded that

Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 14-15, available at
http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/publications/pdf/peterson military.pdf).
19.
See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 618-19 (describing "5 for 6 boys" and similar
schemes); Bruch, supra note 11, at 1267-68; RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 2.2.3.1, at 15.
20. See Bruch, supra note 11, at 1267-68.
21.
See, e.g., Gibbs-Hargrave Shoe Co. v. Peek, 103 So. 672, 673-74 (Ala. 1925) (finding that
the purchase and assignment of wages was a loan subject to small loan law); Hinton v. Mack Purchasing Co., 155 S.E. 78, 80 (Ga. Ct. App. 1930) (indicated that wage assignment was a cover for a
usurious loan); Jackson v. Bloodworth, 152 S.E. 289, 291 (Ga. Ct. App. 1930) (holding that the
"sale" of $20 for $24 in wages payable in two weeks was a usurious loan); State ex rel. Smith v.
McMahon, 280 P. 906, 908 (Kan. 1929) (finding that assignments of wages were usurious loans);
Martin v. Pac. Mills, 158 S.E. 831, 832 (S.C. 1931) (finding that the sale of wages was a usurious
loan). See also Pub. Fin. Corp. of Lynchburg v. Londeree, 106 S.E.2d 760, 767 (Va. 1959) (noting
that the enactment of small loan laws was to eliminate the "evil of salary buying and other extortionate schemes"). The Code expressly prohibits "wage assignments" and deems these transactions
loans. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3-206 (2005). Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a
similar type of transaction, involving the purported "purchase and assignment" at a discount of
anticipated income tax reflnds, was a disguised usurious loan subject to the Code. See Colorado ex
rel. Salazar v. Cash Now Store, Inc., 31 P.3d 161, 163-64, 167 (Colo. 2001).
22.
See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 11, at 1270; Schaaf, supra note 11, at 339. See also Barr,
supra note 17, at 149, 149 n.109 (noting few occurrences of the term "payday loan" prior to 1994 in
a search of a Nexis database).
23.
See Administrative Interpretation NO. 3.104-9201, 1-2 (June 23, 1992) (Adm'r Colo.
Uniform Consumer Credit Code) (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter Admin.
Interpretation No. 3.104-9201 ].
24. Colorado does not regulate check cashing. See id. at 1 (indicating that the Uniform Consumer Credit Code ("Code") applies to "check cashing transactions" only if the transaction involves
an extension of credit).
25. Id.
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these transactions were extensions of credit governed by the Code.26 She
held that the Code's minimum finance charge provision, which allowed a
lender to charge a finance charge of no more than $25 regardless of the
resulting APR,2 7 applied to these transactions.2 8 However, she further
concluded that, if the transaction's resultant APR exceeded 12%, then the
check casher must be licensed as a supervised lender and must comply
with the Code's other provisions, such as those regulating loan disclosures.2 9 Thus officially began modern payday lending in Colorado.30
26.
Id.at 1-2.
27.
See 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 391. The enactment of the DDLA made the Code's minimum
finance charge provision inapplicable to payday loans. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-2-201(7), 5-3.1108(4) (2005).
28.
Admin. Interpretation No. 3.104-9201, supra note 23, at 4. Notably, the Indiana Supreme
Court held that, under Indiana's version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the Indiana Code's
"minimum finance charge" provision did not allow payday lending. See Livingston v. Fast Cash
USA, Inc., 753 N.E.2d 572, 576-77 (Ind. 2001). Indiana's version is significantly different from
Colorado's; the Indiana version omits the word "notwithstanding." Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 52-201(7) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1), (2), and (3) of this section .. ")with
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(7) (2005) (omitting the "notwithstanding" phrase).
29.
Admin. Interpretation NO. 3.104-9201, supra note 23, at 4-6.
Admin. Interpretation No. 3.104-9201 reflects a theme commonly seen in some lenders'
30.
challenges to payday lending regulation - the disguising of the transaction as something other than a
loan so as to avoid application of usury and other consumer credit protection laws. While a thorough
discussion of the many artifices that have been used to disguise payday loans is beyond the scope of
this article, I present a brief synopsis.
Similar to what the Administrator faced, initially some payday lenders claimed their
transactions were non-credit, deferred "check cashing" transactions, with the fees merely "check
cashing" fees and not "finance" charges. The two seminal cases rejecting these claims are Hamilton
v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Ky. 1997), and Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, Tennessee, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (M.D. Tenn. 1999). See Hamilton, 987 F. Supp at 955-58; Turner, F.
Supp. 2d at 1047-49, 1052. Both courts applied basic "substance over form" maxims of usury
jurisprudence to hold that "deferred presentment" check cashing transactions were loans subject to
TILA and state usury laws. See id. In a Mar. 2000 amendment to the OSC, the Federal Reserve
Board removed any doubt that such deferred "check cashing" transactions are credit transactions
under TILA. See 65 Fed. Reg. 17,129 (Mar. 31, 2000) (publishing Supplement I § 226.2(a)(14)-2).
Significantly, the Federal Reserve Board emphasized that the amendment did "not represent a
change in the law." 65 Fed. Reg. at 17,130.
Other devices used to disguise payday loans include (1) making the loan under the guise
of the "sale" of an item, such as catalog merchandise, see, e.g., Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v.
Price, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1376 (S.D. Ga. 2000), Austin v. Alabama Check Cashers Ass'n, Nos.
1011907 & 1011930, 2005 WL 3082884, at *2 (Ala. Nov. 18, 2005); advertisements, see, e.g.,
Henry v. Cash Today, Inc., 199 F.R.D. 566, 568 (S.D. Tex. 2000); merchandise or gift certificates,
see, e.g., New York ex rel. Spitzer v. JAG NY, LLC, 794 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (App. Div. 2005);
Internet service or access contracts, see, e.g., Short on Cash.Net of New Castle, Inc. v. Dep't of Fin.
Insts., 811 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. NCCS Loans,
Inc., No. COA04-1660, 2005 WL 2848029 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2005); pre-paid telephone cards,
see, e.g., Austin, 2005 WL 3082884, at *6, JAG GA, LLC v. Oxendine, No. 2004-CV-3197-6 (Ga.
Super. Ct. May 5, 2005) (judgment affirming administrative cease and desist order); and so-called
"sale/leaseback" transactions, see, e.g., Indus. Loan Comm'r v. Edwards Fin. Servs., Inc., No.
1998CV02055 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2002) (granting summary judgment); see also SAL Leasing,
Inc. v. State ex rel. Napolitano, 10 P.3d 1221, 1224-26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the
sale/leaseback transaction was a disguised car loan). See generallyJohnson, supra note 2, at 18-2 1;
Drysdale & Keest, supranote 11, at 604, 643-44; RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, §§ 7.5.5.4-.6.
Another method used by some payday lenders to circumvent state usury or other consumer credit laws is to partner with a national bank or other federally-insured depository institution.
Fox & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 17, at 15. In these so-called "rent-a-bank" arrangements, no pretense is made as to whether the transaction is a loan. See id.(indicating that the "typical payday
loan-bank arrangement involves loans made over the counter at the non-bank company's location")
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As is seen, it was the Code's "minimum finance charge" provision 31
that allowed the lawful birth of payday lending in Colorado. Applying
this provision to authorize these types of transactions was, perhaps, an
unintended consequence of the provision, unforeseen at the time of the
Code's original enactment in 197 1.32
Accordingly, because payday lending did not exist (at least, not legally) when the Code was first enacted, the Code's requirements were
unsuited for many of the issues peculiar to payday loans. For example,
(emphasis added). Instead, the payday lenders claim that the banks are the true lenders of the loan
and that they act merely as agents for the banks. See id. at 15-16. Since, the argument goes, the
banks are the true lenders, the banks may preempt local state usury laws under the interest rate
exportation powers, see id, provided by, for example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831d (2000), or National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000), see, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.),
N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 737-41, 747 (1996); Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha
Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 313-15 (1978). Thus, the payday lenders/"agents" argue the loan is not
subject to state usury limits or other state payday loan laws. See FOX & MIERZWINSKI, supra note
17, at 15-16. To date, with one exception the courts have rejected the "rent-a-bank" device. Instead, they have held that whether or not the bank is the true lender, or merely a straw man inserted
into the transaction to circumvent state consumer credit law, is an issue analyzed under traditional
"substance over form" usury jurisprudence. See, e.g., Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d
1333, 1346-1351 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (rejecting a preemption challenge against a state law prohibiting
non-bank payday lenders from partnering with banks and using the "rent-a-bank" device where the
non-bank payday lender was the "de facto" lender), affid, 411 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir. 2005); Goleta
Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717-18 (E.D.N.C. 2002) (noting that whether a nonbank payday lender, who partnered with a national bank, was the "de facto" lender was a sharp
factual dispute and such a finding would preclude the non-bank from relying upon the federal preemption/exportation powers applicable to the bank); Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. ACE Cash Express,
Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1284-85 (D. Colo. 2002) (holding that a non-bank payday lender agent
of national bank could not rely upon National Bank Act to remove to federal court the state's regulatory action against it). Butsee Hudson v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C H/S, 2002 WL
1205060, at *4, 6-7 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (expressly eschewing the "substance over form" analysis and
relying on loan documents to hold that bank was the true lender, thus preempting plaintiff's state law
usury claims against the non-bank payday lender agent). See generally Fox & MIERZWINSKI, supra
note 17, at 14-20; Barr, supra note 17, at 150-51; Johnson, supra note 2, at 105-16; RENUART &
KEEST, supra note 11, §§ 3.13, 7.5.5.7.
Similar to the Georgia law involved in Bankwest, supra, and in part to combat the "rent-abank" device, the DDLA regulates not just the "true" lender, but also the lender's agent or other
arranger of the loan. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-102(5)(a) (2005). Thus, all payday loans made
using a non-bank agent or arranger must comply with the DDLA's substantive provisions, regardless
of whether or not the "true" lender is a bank or similar federally insured depository institution. For
example, at issue in Salazar, supra, was whether the DDLA's licensing requirement and onerenewal limit applied to a non-bank agent of a national bank and the loans made through the agent.
See Salazar, 188 F.Supp. 2d at 1284. As part of a settlement reached in the case, the non-bank agent
agreed to become licensed and refund $1.3 million in excess finance charges by reason of violating
the one-renewal limit. See Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 01CV3739
(Denver Dist. Ct. May 6, 2002) (entering consent decree); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, §
3.13.2, at 116 n.740. In regulating not just the "true" lender but also the lender's agent/arranger and
all loans made through the agent/arranger, the DDLA is similar to other "loan arranger" statutes,
such as those in Maryland and Massachusetts. See Fox & MIERzwlNSKI, supra note 17, at 21-22.
Expectedly, most payday loan law circumvention devices occur in states whose legal
environment is hostile to payday lending. See BankWest, Inc. v. Oxendine, 598 S.E.2d 343, 348
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004), reconsiderationdenied, (Apr. 6, 2004), cert. denied,(Sept. 7, 2004) (observing
that a non-bank agent used the "rent-a-bank" arrangement only in states where payday lending was
illegal).
31.
See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
32.
See 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 770-852 (enacting Uniform Consumer Credit Code). See also
Livingston, 753 N.E.2d at 576-77 (indicating that the Uniform Consumer Credit Code did not anticipate short term payday loans).
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the Code did not regulate (1) maximum or minimum payday loan
amounts; (2) the numbers of payday loans a consumer could have outstanding with one lender at any one time; (3) the imposition, besides the
finance charge, of other charges or fees that might be permitted under the
Code, such as deferral or delinquency charges; and (4) a payday lender's
charging the consumer a check cashing fee where the lender paid the
loan proceeds in the form of a check to the consumer. There was concern among various stakeholders, including policy makers, industry
members, and others, that the nature of payday lending required more
regulation than the Code then provided.33
A matter of particular concern involved "loan splitting." As mentioned, the then-Code's minimum finance charge provision allowed a
lender to charge a minimum finance charge of $25, regardless of the resultant APR.34 Relying upon this provision, some payday lenders
quickly saw an opportunity to increase the finance charges they collected
by engaging in the practice of "loan splitting. 3 5 This practice involved a
lender making multiple, smaller payday loans to a consumer in place of
one larger loan in order to multiply the finance charges. For example,
rather than make a single $200 loan to a consumer and charge one allowable $25 finance charge, a lender would make two separate $100 loans
and charge two $25 finance charges - one for each loan - and double its
revenue.

36

Although the then-Code prohibited "loan splitting" "for the purpose
of obtaining a higher finance charge than would otherwise be permitted, 3 7 because the provision spoke in terms of "purpose," there were
perceived difficulties in enforcing this provision in the case of payday
lending.38 For example, a payday lender might argue that the "purpose"
See generally Rule 7 Official Record (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen. pursuant
33.
to COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(8.1) (2005)).
34.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
35.
See Administrative Interpretation No. 3.409-9601, 1 (Aug. 5, 1996) (Adm'r Colo. Uniform Consumer Credit Code) (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter Admin.
Interpretation No. 3.409-9601 ].
See id; Bellizan v. Easy Money of La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-2949, 2002 WL 1066750, at
36.
*3, 9-10 (E.D. La. May 29, 2002) (payday lender engaged in "loan splitting" by splitting one loan
into smaller ones), vacated in part on reconsideration,2002 WL 1611648 (E.D. La. July 19, 2002).
"Loan splitting" may take many forms. For example, in In Re First American Cash Advance, LLC
(Adm'r Colo. Uniform Consumer Credit Code Dec. 15, 2003) (assurance of discontinuance), the
Administrator resolved issues of a payday lender's "loan splitting" where the lender did not allow
spouses to obtain one large joint loan, but instead required them to obtain two smaller loans, one to

each spouse individually.
1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 247 (amending § 5-3-409, now codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 537.
3-205 (2005)). See also Admin. Interpretation No. 3.104-9201, supra note 23, at 5 (applying Code's
"loan splitting" prohibition to payday lending). I use the more descriptive "loan splitting" rather

than the Code's "multiple agreement" terminology.
38. See Admin. Interpretation No. 3.409-9601, supra note 35, at 1-2 (observing that a "loan
splitting" violation may depend upon lender's "purpose and intent," itself a fact specific inquiry).
But cf Bellizan, 2002 WL 1066750, at *9-10 (holding that payday lender's practice of "loan splitting" violated state law's "multiple agreements" prohibition without inquiring into subjective "purpose").
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of splitting loans was not to obtain a higher total finance charge, but to
increase the collectability of the loans. That is, by holding two smaller
instruments from the consumer instead of one larger one, a lender might
claim it increased the probability that, upon the loans' maturity, at least
one of the instruments would clear the consumer's bank. Thus, a payday
lender might attempt to circumvent the Code's "loan splitting" prohibition.
To address the "loan splitting" issue and some of the other Code deficiencies vis-A-vis payday lending, in 1993 the Administrator promulgated Uniform Consumer Credit Code Rule 7.39 Essentially, Rule 7 created a rebuttable presumption in the lender's favor that, so long as the
lender met a number of express conditions prescribed in the Rule, it
could make and have outstanding at any one time with a consumer up to
two payday loans - i.e., engage in limited "loan splitting" - without running afoul of the Code's "loan splitting" prohibition. 40 Among these
conditions were that the lender, "or any person related to such lender by
common ownership or control, or in whom such lender has any financial
interest," could not (1) charge a finance charge greater than the lesser of
(a) 25% of the face amount of the consumer's post-dated check, or (b)
$25; (2) exceed an aggregate amount of $500 for the two outstanding
payday loans; (3) refinance or repay a payday loan with the proceeds of
another payday loan; (4) impose any other charges permitted under the
Code in connection with a payday loan other than the loan's finance
charge; and (5) charge a check cashing fee if it issued the loan proceeds
in the form of a check. 4'
Although Rule 7 helped to alleviate some of the deficiencies in, and
provided both needed guidance to the industry and additional consumer
protections absent from the Code,42 from its outset it was more or less a
"stop-gap" measure. As some said during the Rule's rulemaking hearings, what was needed was a statutory "fix." 43 Further, Rule 7 proved
difficult in its application, requiring the Administrator several years later
to issue a clarifying interpretation. 44 Compounded by the significant rise
in the number of payday lenders over the latter half of the decade, 45 it
39. See 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 902-1 (1993). See Notice of Rulemaking, Proposed Regulations, and Attorney General Opinions, COLO. REG., Jan. 10, 1993, at 16-42 to -43. See also Admin.
Interpretation No. 3.409-9601, supra note 35, at 1-5. Rule 7 was repealed with the DDLA's enactment See 4 CODE COLO. REGS. § 902-1 (2000).
40.
See 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 902-1 (1993); Admin. Interpretation No. 3.409-9601, supra
note 35, at 1-2.
41.
4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 902-1 (1993) (Rule 7 repealed Nov. 1, 2000).
42. Id. ("Statement of Basis, Purpose, and Statutory Authority").
43.
See Summary of the Rulemaking Hearing for Multiple Agreements and Post Dated
Checks 1-2 (Feb. 3, 1993); Notes on the Council of Advisors on Consumer Credit Meeting 2-3
(Dec. 11, 1992). Both of these documents are part of the Rule 7 Official Record (on file with Office
of the Colo. Att'y Gen.).
44. See Admin. Interpretation No. 3.409-9601, supra note 35, at 2-5.
45.
See infra, Part V.
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became apparent that neither Rule 7 nor the Code adequately provided
the necessary structure desired by payday lenders, consumers, and regulators.
IV. THE CODE'S 2000 REVISION AND ENACTMENT OF THE DDLA

At a February 1, 1999, meeting of the Commission on Consumer
Credit,46 while discussing a bill to deregulate the Code, the Commission
unanimously passed a motion to rewrite the Code completely during the
General Assembly's 2000 session.47 Subsequently, the Attorney General
ordered the creation of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Revision
Committee (Committee). 48 The Committee's mandate was to make recommendations for and draft legislation rewriting the Code, taking "due
consideration for, and balanc[ing]," the protection of consumers from
"financially detrimental or unfair" transactions on one hand, and legitimate and scrupulous creditors from "unnecessary governmental regulation" that puts them at a "competitive disadvantage" on the other. 49 As
stated by the Attorney General, the impetuses for this wholesale rewrite
of the Code were the "technological developments, the widespread and
rapid availability of credit, and the development of creative and new
credit practices since 1971 when the [Code was first adopted] ...
This included such practices as payday lending.
The Committee consisted inter alia of representatives of both creditor and consumer interests.51 As part of its mandate, it specifically considered and addressed payday lending. 52 During its consideration of
payday lending issues, the Committee expanded its53membership to include representatives of the payday lending industry.
The discussion of payday lending issues itself required several
Committee meetings. 54 The Committee considered such things as "loan
splitting," posting of fees, the applicability of civil bad check penalty
laws, permissible finance charges, and limits on renewals.55 Although
the Committee could not reach consensus on some critical payday lending issues, such as the maximum allowable finance charge or numbers of
renewals (if any),56 it unanimously agreed that a comprehensive payday
46. The Commission, created by 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 850 (enacting § 73-6-401, later
renumbered as § 5-6-401), was the "policy-making body for purposes of implementing" the Code.
Id.The General Assembly dissolved the Commission in the Code's 2000 revision.
47. See REPORT OF THE UCCC, supra note 12, at 2; Minutes of Meeting, Commission on
Consumer Credit, Feb. 1, 1999 (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.).
48. See Att'y Gen. Admin. Order 1999-4 (Colo. Att'y Gen. Apr. 27, 1999).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51.

See REPORT OF THE UCCC, supra note 12, at 3, 29.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 3, 20-25.
Id.at 3, 29.
Id.at 3.
Id. at 21-25.
Id. at 22-24.
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loan law should be incorporated as a single article of a revised Code.57
The Committee finished its work in November 1999; its efforts resulted
in a proposed comprehensive revised Code draft, including a fullyintegrated article regulating payday loans.5 8
Meanwhile, during the summer of 1999, the American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC) sponsored a conference for, and attended by,
state legislators from a number of states, including Colorado. 59 At this
conference, representatives of the payday lending industry pitched an
industry model payday loan law they hoped the attendees would take
back to their respective state legislatures. 60 As a result of this conference, the industry model bill was brought back to Colorado to be introduced in the upcoming 2000 legislative session.
At this time, the Colorado legislative sponsors of the proposed bill
apparently were unaware of the Committee or its mandate; in particular,
they were unaware of the Committee's efforts to craft payday loan legislation. Unlike the Committee's proposal, the industry model bill was a
stand-alone law. 61 Although contemplated as a separate part of the Code,
it made no references to the Code and did not include such basic provisions as licensing, regulation, or examination, by an agency with regulatory and compliance oversight, of payday lenders.
Before the proposed industry bill was introduced, in late December
1999 (after the Committee's work had finished) one of the bill's sponsors
contacted the Administrator to advise her of the planned bill.62 Thus
aware of two potentially competing payday loan bills in the same legislative session, the Attorney General's office (the prime mover behind the
Committee's effort), decided to eliminate the payday loan provisions
from the Committee's contemplated Code revision. 63 Instead, it worked
with the sponsors and the legislative drafting office to conform the industry bill into something that would comport with the revised Code and
64
payday loan regulation, as the Committee had envisioned it.
However,
much like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole, the initial draft of
57.

Id.at21.

58.
See Draft Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code, §§ 5-2-401 to 5-2-409 in Appendix,
REPORT OF THE UCCC (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter Draft U.C.C.C.].

59.

ALEC's goals are "[t]o promote the principles of federalism by developing and promoting

polices that reflect the Jeffersonian principles" of government and "[to enlist state legislators from

all parties . ..who share ALEC's mission."

Am. Legis. Exchange Couns., Mission Statement,

http://www.alec.org/about/mission-statement.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).

60. See, e.g, Show Me the Money: A Survey of Payday Lenders and Review of Payday
Lender Lobbying in State Legislatures, http://uspirg.org/reports/paydayloans2000/showmethemoney
final.PDF (showing that the payday loan industry has actively lobbied state legislatures for laws it

deems favorable).
61.
See Office of Legislative Legal Services, Colorado General Assembly, LLS 00-0610.01
(initial draft of the "Deferred Presentment Services Act," Dec. 20, 1999; this draft would have created a new Part 7 to Title 5,Article 3 of the Code) (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.).

62.
63.

Author's personal recollections.
Id.

64.

Id.
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the industry bill required major surgery to make it fit within the proposed
revised Code.6 5
The end result of these efforts was the introduction of two separate
bills: House Bill (HB) 00-1185, the culmination of the Committee's
work to revise comprehensively the Code, but without any payday loan
provisions; and SB 00-144, the separate payday loan bill, which upon
enactment would be a part of the revised Code. 66 However, and despite
the many changes, both pre- and post-introduction, to SB 00-144 to integrate it into the Code, the result was not as perfect a fit as would have
been had the Committee's comprehensive revision instead been
adopted.67
One particularly contentious issue concerned the maximum allowable finance charge. As originally introduced, SB 00-144 provided for a
finance charge of 20% of the amount financed.6 8 While the industry
supported this figure, consumer advocates and others sought a lower
70
figure. 69 The 20% figure survived the bill's debate in the Senate.
However, the House Business Affairs and Labor Committee subsequently amended the bill to lower the maximum finance charge to 15%.71
This figure was amended again, despite substantial dissent, during the
bill's second reading debate on the House floor to the finally enacted
version providing a "step" rate finance charge. 72 This compromise incorporated the industry's 20% finance charge rate for loans of $300 or
less, and a marginal rate of 7.5% for the next $200 in principal, yielding
a total maximum allowable finance charge rate of 15% for loan amounts
of the maximum allowable $500. 73 Significantly, the Commission, al65. See supra,Draft U.C.C.C. note 58.
66. HB 00-1185, 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess. (Colo. 2000) (repealing and reenacting the
Code in its entirety); SB 00-144, 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess. (Colo. 2000) (creating and adding
the DDLA as a new article to the Code.).
67. For example, the DDLA contains some perhaps superfluous repetition that did not exist in
the Committee's draft, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-115 (2005) (requiring same record keeping
and annual reporting as in COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-304 (2005)); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-116
(2005) (requiring same licensure requirements as in COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-2-301 & 5-2-302
(2005)); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-117 (2005) (providing for same compliance examinations and
investigations as in COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-305 (2005)). Additionally, whereas the Committee's
draft bill would have built upon Rule 7's loan splitting protections by specifically defining "lender"
to include any and all affiliates thereof, see Draft U.C.C.C., supra note 58 (§ 5-2-401(2), 5-2401(3)), SB 00-144 did not.
68. SB 00-144, 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess. (Colo. 2000).
69. See generally Hearings on SB 00-144 Before the Senate Business Affairs and Labor
Committee, 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess. (Jan. 31, 2000).
70. See Colo. S. Jour., 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess., at 197 (Feb. 1, 2000) (committee
report); id. at 268 (Feb. 11, 2000) (2d reading); id. at 299-300 (Feb. 14, 2000) (3d reading).
71.
Colo. H. Jour., 62d General Assembly, 2d Sess., at 877-78 (Colo. Mar. 10, 2000) (committee report) [hereinafter House Journal]. See generally Hearings on SB 00-144 Before the House
Business Affairs and Labor Committee, 62d General Assembly 2d Sess. (Mar. 7, 2000).
72.
See House Journal, supra note 71, at 1142-43 (Mar. 29, 2000) (2d reading amendment);
id., at 1146-47 (attempt to override amendment); see generally Hearings on SB 00-144 Before the
House Committee of the Whole (Mar. 29, 2000).
73.
See COLO. REV. STAT. 5-3.1-105 (2005).
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though it could not reach consensus on an appropriate finance charge
figure, did not advocate a "step" rate.74
Ultimately, both bills became law, and the revised Code, including
the incorporated DDLA, became effective July 1, 2000. 75
76
V. THE GROWTH OF PAYDAY LENDING IN COLORADO

Over the last decade, Colorado has experienced a dramatic growth
in payday lending. This growth has occurred both in terms of (1) the
numbers of licensed lenders and their locations, and (2) total loan volume.
As of January 1, 1997, Colorado had 177 licensed payday loan locations. Over the next several years, growth was steady, but modest; as of
July 1, 2000, there were 212 licensed locations. Since July 1, 2000, the
effective date of the DDLA, growth has been nothing short of explosive.
As of January 1, 2005, there were 616 licensed payday loan locations in
Colorado. Further, over 80% of these locations obtained their licenses
after July 1, 2000. See Figure 1.
Mirroring the growth in numbers of payday lender locations, the increase in total payday loan volume has been no less explosive. Total
payday loan volume for 1996 was $34 million. The next several years
saw steady growth, with total loan volume for 2000 of $106 million.
However, in 2001, the first full calendar year after the enactment of the
DDLA, volume jumped to $180 million; it has been mushrooming ever
since, totaling $368 million for 2004, the last full year for which data is
available.77 See Figure 2.
With this growth has come a change in the industry's complexion. Up
until the DDLA, most Colorado payday loan locations were stand-alone,
independent, and locally-owned "mom and pop" operations. However,
since the DDLA's enactment the industry has undergone a major consolidation.
A number of national, out-of-state corporations
74.
REPORT OF THE UCCC, supra note 12, at 22-23.
75.
See 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 1257 (most provisions of the revised Code); id. at 444
(DDLA).
76. The data and figures reported in this section are derived principally from the Administrator's Deferred Deposit Lenders Supervised Lenders' Annual Reports for the respective years, or
other records maintained by and publicly available from the Administrator. COLO. REV. STAT. § 52-304(2) requires every supervised lender (including payday lenders, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3. 1 115 (2005)) to file annual reports with the Administrator. The Administrator then prepares a composite report consolidating the data received from the individual lenders' reports. The Administrator
does not audit or otherwise verify the information submitted by the individual lenders before including it in her composite annual report.
77.
Although an exploration of the reasons for the growth in payday lending is beyond the
scope of this article, a number of theories have been advanced, including (1) the deregulation of the
banking industry, (2) the absence of traditional small loan providers, and (3) the elimination of
interest rate caps. See generally Moss, supra, note I at 1732-33; Schaaf, supra, note 11, at 340-41.
No doubt, at least part of the growth since 2000 must be attributed to the friendly regulatory environment created by the DDLA.
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Figure 2: Total annual payday loan volume.
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Table 2: The Ten Largest DDLA Licensees78 (as of Dec. 31, 2004)
Licensee
ACE Cash Express, Inc.
Advance America Cash Advance Centers
of Colorado, LLC
BN'T Loans, LLC
Check Into Cash of Colorado, Inc.
Monetary Management of California, Inc.
EZPawn Colorado, Inc.
Allied Cash Advance Colorado LLC
Valued Services of Colorado, LLC
Pawn One, Inc.
Checkmate of Colorado, Inc.
All Others
Total

# of Licenses
81

91
34
26
25
21
20
16
14
230
616

78.
ACE Cash Express, Inc., d/b/a ACE America's Cash Express, is a Texas corporation with
principal offices in Irving, Texas. It obtained its first licenses in Oct. 1992. By July 1, 2000, it
operated approximately 51 licensed locations. Although it subsequently cancelled its licenses,
resulting in the "rent-a-bank" litigation discussed supra, note 30, it reapplied for and received 53
new licenses, effective Nov. 2001. The number of ACE licenses in Table 2 does not include independently-owned ACE franchise locations.
Advance America Cash Advance Centers of Colorado, LLC, d/b/a Advance America, is a
Delaware company with principal offices in Spartanburg, South Carolina. It obtained its first Colorado license in June 1998 and, since July 1, 2000, has added 37 licensed locations.
BN'T Loans, LLC, is a Missouri corporation located in Springfield, Missouri. It opened
its first Colorado location in Feb. 2004. In Dec. 2004, the agent for BN'T, The Cigarette Store
Corp., d/b/a Smoker Friendly, d/b/a Gasamat, through whom BN'T made loans, obtained 45 licenses
for 45 locations in which it acted as BN'T agent. The figures in Table 2 includes the 45 licenses
held by BN'T's agent; BN'T itself had 46 licenses. Both BN'T and its agent cancelled their licenses
in Feb. 2005. This resulted in a drop of only a few points in the percentage of licenses held by the
ten largest licensees.
Check Into Cash of Colorado, Inc., d/b/a Check Into Cash, is a Colorado corporation with
principal offices in Cleveland, Tennessee. It opened its first location in Nov. 2000.
Monetary Management of California, Inc., d/b/a Loan Mart, is a California corporation
located in Berwyn, Pennsylvania. It first became licensed in Colorado in Sept. 2000. It is a subsidiary of Dollar Financial Group, Inc., which in turn is a subsidiary of Dollar Financial Corp., a publicly-traded company incorporated in Delaware with principal offices in Berwyn, Pennsylvania.
EZPawn Colorado, Inc., d/b/a EZMoney Payday Loans, is a Delaware corporation based
in Austin, Texas. It obtained its first Colorado license in June 2001.
Allied Cash Advance Colorado LLC, d/b/a Allied Cash Advance, is a Delaware company
with principal offices in Miami, Florida. It opened its first Colorado location in May 2003.
Valued Services of Colorado, LLC, d/b/a First American Cash Advance, is a Georgia
company based in Chattanooga, Tennessee. It obtained its licenses in May 2004, due to a change in
ownership of its predecessor entity, First American Cash Advance of Colorado, LLC. The predecessor entity was a Tennessee company located in Cleveland, Tennessee, and first became licensed in
Colorado in Dec. 2000.
Pawn One, Inc., d/b/a Jumping Jack Cash, a Colorado corporation based in Westminster,
Colorado, is the only local company in the top ten. It obtained its current licenses beginning in
January 2004 (between Apr. 1997 and Jan. 1998, it briefly held a single license).
Checkmate of Colorado, Inc., d/b/a Checkmate Payday Loans and Check Cashing, is a
Nevada corporation with principal offices in Carlsbad, California. It opened its first Colorado licensed location in Aug. 2003.
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Figure 3: Ten largest DDLA licensees (as of Dec. 31, 2004).

either began doing business or expanded their operations in Colorado to
such an extent that they now dominate the market. As of December 31,
2004, the ten largest licensees accounted for nearly 63% (62.66%) of all
licensed locations, with the remaining licensed locations scattered among
some 109 separate, small sole proprietorships or companies.7 9 See Table
2 and Figure 3.
VI. THE STUDY, ITS METHODOLOGY OF DATA COLLECTION, AND ITS

RESULTS

A. The DatabasesandData Collection Methodology
In July 2000, as part of their regular compliance examinations,"0 the
Administrator's staff began collecting various data from payday lenders
concerning their loans. This was done in part to provide insight into
payday lenders' lending practices and their consumers' borrowing habits,
79. This data seems to contradict the industry's position that payday loan outlets are "really
small businesses, not part of a [sic] enormous national industry scheme." Schaaf, supra, note 11, at
349.
80. Pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-305 (2005), the Administrator is authorized to conduct periodic compliance examinations of supervised lenders. These compliance examinations entail
reviewing the lender's "loans, business, and records". Id. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-117 (2005)
makes this compliance examination authority specifically applicable to payday lenders. This latter
section is another example of a DDLA "duplicative" provision that a comprehensive Code revision,
as envisioned by the Committee, likely would have eliminated. See supra,note 67.
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and thus facilitate a study and evaluation of the DDLA's efficacy.
Among the categories of loan data collected were: (1) the terms of the
loans being written, including the amount financed, the finance charge,
and the length of the loan; (2) whether, and how often, the loans were
renewed or "rolled over"; and (3) individual consumer borrowing information, such as how many loans a particular consumer obtained or had
outstanding with a particular lender over the previous twelve month period.
Additionally, beginning in July 2001, the staff started collecting
consumer demographic information. The staff culled this information
from the consumers' loan applications and income verification information obtained by the lenders at the time of the consumer's first loan from
the lender. Among the demographic data collected were the consumer's
(1) age, (2) gender, (3) marital status, (4) monthly income, (5) job classification (e.g., professional, managerial, laborer, etc.), and (6) length of
time at current employment.
The staff recognized that the validity of any analysis of the data collected depended upon the sampling from which the data was taken - that
is, the sample should be random. Accordingly, to assure randomness, for
loan data collection the staff selected for study a particular lender's thirty
most recent loan transactions preceding the date of that lender's compliance examination. It is from these thirty loan transactions, and their respective consumers' loan histories, that the examiners gathered information concerning loan terms, renewals, and the consumers' borrowing
histories. The examiners gathered the same information from each set of
thirty most recent loans from whatever lender they happened to examine.
Thus, the database should not be skewed in any manner, such as by favoring loans made (1) on particular dates or times of month, (2) by specific lenders or in particular geographic locations, or (3) to particular
consumer groups (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and the like).
Similar to the methodology used in collecting loan data, to assure
randomness in consumer demographic data the examiners selected for
study those consumers who applied for and obtained their first loan with
the lender being examined within the thirty days preceding the date of
the compliance examination. For manageability purposes, the examiners
limited the size of the sample of consumers per compliance examination
to thirty. That is, if more than thirty consumers obtained first loans from
the lender within the previous thirty days, then the sample was limited to
the most recent thirty consumers. In practice, because few lenders had
more than thirty new consumers in any thirty-day period, the examiners
rarely used this limitation.
The Administrator's staff continues to collect both loan and consumer demographic data as part of their regular payday lender compliance examinations. Accordingly, the databases are growing daily. However, for purposes of this article I use a database cut-off date of Decem-
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ber 31, 2004. As of this date, the Administrator's staff had amassed loan
data from over 22,000 separate loan transactions obtained during some
760 separate compliance examinations of 402 separate licensed payday
lender locations. Similarly, as of this date the consumer demographic
database consisted of over 10,000 separate entries collected during the
course of over 680 compliance examinations. 8
Both databases can be analyzed from a variety of temporal perspectives, such as calculating averages over the databases' entire lives or
from one particular point in time to another. In this way, the databases
can be used to discern trends over time in payday lending under the
DDLA. Most of the statistics in this paper are based on analyses of the
entire databases from their inception through the December 31, 2004,
cut-off. Whenever a statistic is based upon a particular
temporal subset
82
of the databases, such as to spot trends, I so state.
B. ConsumerDemographics
The "average" Colorado payday loan borrower is a thirty-six yearold single woman, making $2,370 per month, employed as a laborer or
office worker and in her current job for about three and one-half years.
More specifically:
- The average age of a payday loan borrower is just over 35.8 years
old, with the average age between men and women nearly identical.
Borrowers are skewed towards the younger age groups, with almost
two-thirds - 62.41% - of all borrowers falling between the ages of
twenty to thirty-nine years old. Those 55 years or older comprise
7.42% of all borrowers, and those sixty-five years or older only
1.67%.

* Women make up more than half of all borrowers, 54.99% to
45.01% for men.
- Single borrowers outnumber married borrowers, 52.67% to
47.33%.

- The average borrower has worked at his or her current job for 3.49
years (3.57 years for men and 3.43 for women). However, nearly a
quarter - 22.07% - of all borrowers were employed at their current
jobs for less than six months.

81.
The databases, appropriately redacted to remove any specific consumer or lender identifying information, are available for public study upon request to the Administrator or Colorado Attorney General's office.
82.
Because not all lenders obtain identical consumer demographic information on their loan
applications, the sample size of this database varies depending upon the particular category of datum. Further, where data in a particular category was not available from a particular lender, this was
not factored into the database. Accordingly, where averages are derived from the data, they are done
so only from samples where data was obtained.
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- The average monthly gross income for all borrowers is $2,373
($2,606 for men and $2,186 for women). Consumers earning less
than $2,500 per month comprised nearly two-thirds - 62.88% - of all
borrowers, and the median monthly gross income is $2,170.

The data also reveals a nearly inverse relationship between the borrower's occupational category and monthly income, on one hand, and the
numbers of borrowers within that category, on the other. As shown by
Table 3, the majority of all borrowers - 62.80% - occupy the lowest three
income categories. Very few payday loan borrowers - from the database
sample, only twenty, or 0.24% - are "professionals," such as doctors,
lawyers, dentists, and the like, with average incomes in excess of
$50,000.83
C. Average Loan Terms

The "average" payday loan has the following characteristics:
- The average amount financed, or loan principal, is $285.36. This
figure has crept up slightly over time; for example, the average loan
amount during the 2003 calendar year was $283.20, and for 2004 was
$308.16.
- The average finance charge is $50.87. Here, too, the trend for this
figure seems to be on the rise; in 2003, the average finance charge
was $51.22, and in 2004 was $53.84.
- The average loan term is 16.63 days. However, slightly over 60%
(60.34%) of all loans are for fourteen days or less. These figures
have held fairly steady over time.

83.
The study's consumer demographic data contrasts somewhat with that touted by the
industry. See, e.g., Schaaf, supra, note 11, at 348-49 (citing industry sources that claim the average
annual income is $33,000, with length of current employment at 4 years); see also, Community
Customer Profile,
Association
of America, Payday Advance
Financial Services
http://www.cfsa.net/govrelat/pdf/Payday Advance Customer Profile.pdf (citing statistics showing
77% of borrowers have incomes greater than $25,000, with 25% greater than $50,000); Freedom of
Choice for Consumers: The Truth About Deferred Deposit Services - A Reasoned Response to the
CFA's Misrepresentations, http://www.fisca.orgddresponse.htm. (claiming average consumer has
income from $20,000 to $25,000 on the low side and $35,000 to $45,000 on the high side) [hereinafter Freedom of Choice for Consumers]. CFSA and FiSCA are the two leading national payday
lending trade associations. See Welcome to CFSA, http://www.cfsa.net ("CFSA is the only national
membership trade association [of the] Deferred Presentment industry", representing "approximately
two-thirds of this market"); Quick Facts About FiSCA, http://www.fisca.orglqa.htm ("FiSCA is a
national trade association that represents 5,000 neighborhood financial service centers); see also
Motion of Financial Service Centers of America, Inc. for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae at 1,
Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Colo. 2002) (No. 01D-1576) (FiSCA is the "largest voluntary trade association in the payday-loan industry"). At least
one commentator suggests the industry's data "should be treated with caution." Barr, supra, note 17,
at 153 n. 135. And, while military personnel represent less than 5% of all payday loan borrowers, a
recent paper suggests payday lenders disproportionately target military bases, including those in
Colorado, in which to set up shop and market their services. See Graves & Petersen, supra, note 18
at 93-97, 178-79.
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Table 3: Consumer Occupations
Occupation
Professional
Managerial
Government
Agricultural
Education
Military
Sales
Healthcare
Other
Laborer
Office
Benefits Recipient

Average Income ($)
4,852
3,872
3,160
2,811
2,758
2,620
2,571
2,552
2,468
2,213
2,209
1,358

% of Consumers
0.24
3.66
6.51
0.08
2.93
4.26
4.00
7.20
8.32
30.25
23.79
8.76

Based on these averages, the average payday loan has an APR of
391.34%. There does not seem to be any particular trend for this figure; in 2003, the average APR was 398.76%, and in 2004 it was
381.56%.
Some statistics appear to be attributable directly to the DDLA's peculiar two-tiered "step" rate finance charge limits. As previously mentioned, 4 the DDLA allows a maximum finance charge of 20% of the first
$300 of loan principal and 7.5% of the next $200 of principal, up to a
maximum loan amount of $500. Accordingly, the most profitable payday loans, in terms of maximum allowable finance charges, are those
written for $300 or less. Above $300, the marginal rate of return diminishes significantly. See supra Table 1.
Not surprisingly, therefore, almost three-quarters - 72.93% - of all

payday loans are written for loan amounts of $300 or less. Indeed, the
most frequent single loan amount is exactly $300, accounting for nearly a
third - 29.92% - of all payday loans.

The DDLA's "step" rate system leads to potential problems. First,
as the data indicates these rates may encourage some lenders to "steer"
consumers to loans of $300 or less.
A more serious problem involves "loan splitting." 85 That is, some
lenders may require consumers, who may want a single, large loan above
the $300 threshold, to obtain two smaller loans under the $300 tier and
thereby realize a total finance charge in excess of what would be allowable with the single, large loan.
84.
85.

See supra, Part I.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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As discussed previously,8 6 "loan splitting" was a problem that existed under the pre-DDLA Code, in response to which the Administrator
promulgated Rule 7. However, rather than advance Rule 7's attempt to
combat "loan splitting," the DDLA's "step" rate structure statutorily creates an incentive for some lenders to engage in "loan splitting." Thus,
the DDLA seemingly brings the Code full circle back to its pre-Rule 7
days.
D. Finance ChargeRates and Competition - The "Race to the Bottom"
The payday loan industry in part justifies the high finance charges
and triple-digit interest rates associated with payday loans based on the
"huge" risks incurred with such loans; one industry paper pegs these
risks "typically at least seven to 10 times greater than banks are willing
to accept. '87 However, payday lenders' loss rate experience, as reported
to the Administrator by the lenders themselves, refutes this claim.
Specifically, for the years 1996 through 2004, payday lenders report
an average charge-off rate, or loss experience, of 3.34% of their total
loan volume. 88 This loss rate compares favorably to commercial banks'
charge-off rates on consumer loans, as reported by the Federal Reserve
Board. For the same period, the charge-off rate for all consumer loans
made at commercial banks was 2.69%; for credit cards, it was 5.15%.89
The study also controverts the industry's claims of the role competitive market forces play in determining finance charges. That is, a major
payday lending trade association has claimed that payday loan fees are
"set by competitive forces in the market." 90 However, the data does not
support this claim. Rather, competition among payday lenders appears to

86.
See id.
87.
Freedom of Choice for Consumers, supra, note 83; see also Schaaf,supra, note 11 at 349
(noting industry claims that rates are "proportional to the risk undertaken.").
88.
See Annual Reports described supra, note 76. As part of their annual reports, payday
lenders are required to report their total volume of loans charged off. The loss experience is expressed as the ratio of total charge-offs to total loan volume. The charge-off ratio ranged from a low
of 2.28% in 2000 to a high of 4.14% in 2004. These figures are consistent with data reported elsewhere. See, e.g., RENUART & KEEST, supra, note 11 § 7.5.5.2, at 294-95 (5.4% and 1.7% charge off
rates for two publicly-traded payday lenders); see also Bruch, supra, note 11, at 1279 n.243 (comparing payday lending charge-off rates with those of check cashers). Another publicly-traded payday lender, Dollar Financial Corp., reported net charge-offs of 2.0% and 2. 1% in its quarterly results
for the quarters ending June 30 and Sept. 30, 2005, respectively. See Press Release, Dollar Financial
Corp. Announces Fiscal Fourth Quarter and Year End Results; Strong International Revenue Growth
of 25.5% and Total Revenue Growth of 21.5% Drive Results (Aug. 23, 2005), http://www.dfg.com
(follow "Investor Relations" hyperlink); Press Release, Dollar Financial Corp., Dollar Financial
Corp. Announces 2006 Fiscal First Quarter Results; Growth of 12.6% Drives Growth in Net Income
(Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.dfg.com (follow "Investor Relations" hyperlink).
89.
See Charge-Off and Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/chgallsa.htm (seasonally adjusted).
90.
Freedom of Choice for Consumers, supra, note 83. This paper goes on to say these
"forces are already at work as is demonstrated by fee competition in many locales ... in this highly
competitive industry." Id.
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have little to do with what lenders charge consumers, and finance charge
amounts appear to be highly inelastic.
In particular, the study shows that in 89.27% of all loans, the loan's
finance charge was for the maximum amount, to the very penny, allowed
by the DDLA. Further, the trend over time shows a gravitation 9' by
lenders to charge the maximum allowable finance charge, with 91.70%
of all loans written in 2003 for the maximum charge. In 2004, that figure
rose to 92.75%.
Where there is any "competition" in finance charge pricing, it occurs primarily in what can be characterized as "promotional" loans. For
example, some lenders offer discounts to consumers for the consumer's
very first loan; others will discount, for example, every tenth loan. Additionally, some lenders may offer discounts to consumers who refer new
business. Other than these types of "promotional" activities, very few
lenders regularly charge the consumer anything less than the maximum
the DDLA allows.9 2
Accordingly, it does not appear that competitive "market-place
forces" are what drive payday loan fees.93
E. The ConsecutiveLoan and Repeat Customer - the Lenders'Bread
andButter
A common concern among consumer advocates and others involves
the so-called "debt treadmill" or "debt cycle" in which payday loan borrowers often find themselves.9 4 That is, many consumers who take out a
91.
Or, perhaps more accurately, a "levitation."
92. The study revealed that some lenders will round down to the nearest dollar the finance
charge on certain "odd-amount" loans (e.g., charging $71 instead of the maximum allowable $71.25
on a $450 loan). A few lenders charge a straight 15% finance charge regardless of the size of the
loan. However, as shown by the data, these instances are rare.
93.
This result should not be surprising. Consumers who find it necessary to patronize payday lenders likely are in dire financial straits. See Jackson v. Check 'N Go, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 544,
547 (N.D. 111.2000) (observing that consumers would not borrow money from payday lenders, at
triple digit interest rates, unless "necessitous"); see also Taylor v. Halsted Fin. Serv., LLC, No. 99 C
2466, 2000 WL 33201925, *8-10 (N.D. 11. Jan. 13, 2000) (granting class certification in action
against payday lender where putative class members alleged to be "poor and unsophisticated or
financially necessitous"). Further, it long has been a paradigm of usury jurisprudence that necessitous borrowers are willing "to concede whatever may be demanded or to promise whatever may be
exacted in order to obtain temporary relief from financial embarrassment." Hurt v. Crystal Ice &
Cold Storage Co., 286 S.W. 1055, 1056 (Ky. 1926); see also, Wilcox v. Moore, 93 N.W.2d 288, 291
(Mich. 1958) (noting purpose of usury laws "is to protect the necessitous borrower from extortion").
Thus, it may be inferred that consumers who, by reason of their financial circumstances, need payday loans largely are rate insensitive. See also Bruch, supra note 11, at 1282-83 (noting because
payday loan consumers are often in dire financial straits with nowhere else to go, they are unable to
exercise meaningful choice and payday lenders enjoy a "captive market"); Drysdale, supra note 11,
at 662 and nn.442-44 (showing that justification for payday loans - that consumers face financial
emergencies with nowhere else to go - belies contention that market forces are at work); Schaaf,
supra note 11, at 344, 345 (noting that by reason of their financial situation, payday loan consumers
are not "price driven").
94.
See, e.g., Drysdale, supra note 11, at 605-09 (reporting on "debt treadmill"); Barr, supra
note 17, at 157-58 (observing "debt trap" resulting from payday loans); Bruch, supra note 11, at
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payday loan are unable to pay off the loan in full on its due date. The
lenders will then allow the consumer to renew the loan for an additional
period of time by paying an additional finance charge. This cycle is repeated over and over, with the borrower continually renewing the loan
but never getting out from under the loan by paying it off completely. In
one seminal case, a consumer initially borrowed $300 and, after renewing the loan numerous consecutive times over an eight month period, in
which she paid the lender a total of $840 in finance charges, ended up
defaulting on the loan.95
In what is perhaps the most striking aspect of the study is the confirmation that Colorado payday loan consumers also often find themselves trapped in a cycle of debt. This is true despite the DDLA's onerenewal limit. 96 Indeed, it is the "repeat" customer that accounts for the
overwhelming majority of the payday lender's loan volume and revenue,
i.e., its "bread and butter."
I start with the overall picture. According to the study, the average
payday loan consumer obtains 9.38 payday loans from the same lender
within any given twelve-month period. Therefore, using the study's average loan amounts, finance charges, and loan terms, 97 the average payday loan consumer pays a total of $477.16 in finance charges and is indebted for a total period of just over five out of twelve months at each
licensed
payday lender location with which the consumer does busi98
ness.
These figures present only the gross picture. A more in-depth
analysis of the data reveals a sharper, and perhaps starker, image. It is to
that picture I now turn.
First, the study's empirical data likely understates the frequency
with which the "average" consumer obtains a payday loan or the overall
length of time, in any given time period, in which that consumer is indebted to a payday lender. Specifically, and similar to other regulators'
studies, 99 the study's data collection and analysis so far does not entail a
cross-referencing of consumers between or among several payday lenders. Accordingly, the study does not account for whether an individual
consumer obtained or had outstanding loans from more than one licensed
1273-74 (payday loans create "debt treadmill"); Fox & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 17, at 7 (payday
loan consumers run high risk of "becoming trapped in perpetual debt"); see also Schaaf, supra note
11, at 345-47 (high cost of payday loans causes consumer to become captive to lender).
95.
See Turner v. E.Z. Check Cashing of Cookeville, Tennessee, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042,
1046 (M.D. Tenn. 1999).
96.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(1) (2005); see supratext accompanying note 13.
97. See supra, Part VI.C.
98.
$50.87 average finance charge times 9.38 loans equals $477.16. The 16.63 day average
loan term times 9.38 loans equals 155.99 days, or a little over 5 months.
99. See, e.g., Fox & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 17, at 8 (observing that several regulators'
studies do not include information on rate at which consumers borrow from more than one lender);
ERNST, supra note 17, at 5 n.14, 7 (same).
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location. 00 Nevertheless, anecdotally there is evidence that indicates
consumers may have more than one payday loan outstanding to more
than one payday lender at any one time, and that consumers borrow regularly from more than one payday lender.1 ' Further, this evidence indicates that consumers often will "borrow from Peter to pay Paul," that is,
they will obtain a payday loan from one lender in order to pay off an
outstanding payday loan due another lender. 10 2 Based on this anecdotal
evidence, it is likely that the gross "averages" set out above underreport
the true nature of the "debt trap" in which consumers find themselves.103
Second, the study shows that the "repeat" consumer - i.e., a borrower who obtains more than the occasional loan from the same lender in
a given period - accounts for the bulk of payday lenders' loan volume
and revenue. For example, according to the study consumers who obtained sixteen or more payday loans with the same lender in any twelvemonth period accounted for 20.10% of all payday loan borrowers. These
consumers accounted for nearly half - 46.72% - of lenders' total annual
loan volume. Indeed, nearly two-thirds (65.42%) of a lender's annual
loan volume is comprised of consumers who borrow twelve or more
times a year, yet these consumers make up only 33.34% of all payday
loan borrowers. See Figures 4-6.
As these figures demonstrate, the "repeat" consumer accounts for a
disproportionately large share of lenders' revenues. From this, it may be
concluded that Colorado payday lenders derive the majority of their
revenues from, and hence are economically dependent upon, the "repeat"
borrower. ' 04
100.
The DDLA does not prohibit one payday lender from extending a loan to a consumer who
may be indebted to another separate payday lender.
101.
During their regular compliance examinations, the examiners saw many of the same
consumers' names appearing time and again in various lenders' records. See also ERNST, supra note
17, at 7 (reporting survey showing 47% of payday loan borrowers use more than one lender per
year).
102.
See, e.g., Drysdale, supra note 11, at 601; Johnson, supra note 2, at 57; Barr, supra note
17, at 156.
103.
Recently, the Administrator undertook a limited exercise of the type of precise examination that so far is absent from the study. She compared all individual consumers who had loans
outstanding at a group of different Front Range, Denver/Colorado Springs metro area payday loan
locations during one week in March 2005. Although the data from this comparison is limited, is not
part of the main study, and no broad conclusions should be drawn therefrom, this data reveals the
following. This group of locations had loans with a combined total outstanding (net of finance
charges) of just over $3 million ($3,019,228) from 7,358 consumers. A little over 20% of these
consumers (20.11%) had multiple loans outstanding at any one time from more than one of these
locations. These multiple-loan consumers accounted for a disproportionate 38.75% of outstanding
loan volume. Further, the average loan amount generally increased with the number of outstanding
loans, starting at $324.14 for consumers with two outstanding loans and rising to $347.14 for consumers with six outstanding loans. Two consumers had seven loans outstanding at one time. Their
average loan amount was $485.71, meaning that some consumers may have as much as or more than
$3,400 in payday loans outstanding at any one time. This limited comparison suggests confirmation
of the anecdotal evidence reported above.
104.
This result is consistent with what has been reported elsewhere. See, e.g., Drysdale, supra
note 11, at 608 (both Indiana and Illinois report that repeat customer is lenders' main source of
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Figure 4: Proportion of DDLA consumers by number of loans (preceding
twelve months).
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Figure 5: Proportion of lenders' DDLA loan volume by consumer loan
frequency (preceding twelve months).
revenue); Barr, supra note 17, at 157 (frequent-use customers are "revenue drivers" for payday
industry (citing North Carolina statistics)); ERNST, supra n.17, at 4-5 (based on analysis showing
that 56% of payday industry revenues are generated from consumers with 13 or more loans per year
and other studies, authors conclude industry relies on "business model that encourages chronic
borrowing" and that such "churning" "is largely responsible" for industry's volume).
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Figure 6: Comparison of proportions of DDLA consumers and proportion of loan volume (preceding twelve months).
Third, the study indicates the issue of renewals is of significant concern. As previously mentioned, a renewal occurs when, at the end of the
initial loan's term, the consumer pays just the loan's finance charge to
extend the loan for an additional term.'1 5 As above mentioned, the
DDLA limits to one the
number of times a lender may consecutively
10 6
loan.
payday
a
renew
According to the study, 18.85% of all payday loan transactions are
renewals. Further, this appears to be an increasing trend. For the calendar year 2003, this percentage grew to 19.56%, and in 2004 the rate was
20.28%.
Fourth, and perhaps more pernicious because they are unregulated,
are the non-renewal rollovers. 10 7 According to the study, a third of all
payday loan transactions - 34.40% - involve same-day, or "touch and

go," rollovers. As with true renewals, this trend is increasing - for 2003,
34.70% of all loan transactions were "touch and go" rollovers, and in
2004, this figure increased to 37.48%.

105.
106.
107.

See supra text accompanying note 12.
See COLO. REV. STAT. 5-3.1-108(1) (2005); see also text accompanying note 13.
See supra Part I and note 12 (distinguishing between renewals and rollovers).
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As mentioned, although the DDLA limits to one the number of renewals, there are no limits to the number of times a lender may "rollover" a loan by extending a new loan to the consumer immediately after
the consumer pays off a previous loan.'0 8 However, the net economic
effect of these types of "rollovers" is identical to that of a "true" renewal:
(1) the consumer does not receive any net funds; (2) for the net payment
of an additional finance charge, the lender extends the consumer's loan
for an additional term; and (3) at the end of the additional term, the consumer still owes the same principal amount of the first loan.'0 9
When the numbers of both true renewals and rollovers (collectively
called "consecutive" loans) are summed together, it is seen that consecutive loans make up the majority of all payday loan transactions. Over the
course of the study, consecutive loans comprised 53.25% of all loans
made. Further, this percentage has climbed steadily over time - in 2003,
54.25% of all loans were consecutive, rising to 57.76% in 2004. See
Figure 7.
60%
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" 30%
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U 20%
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Figure 7: Proportion of "consecutive loans."
108.
See supratext accompanying note 16.
109.
See, e.g., Barr, supra note 17, at 156; ERNST, supra note 17, at 3-4; Drysdale, supra note
11, at 601 (all observing that a "touch and go" or like "rollover" transaction is the functional and
economic equivalent of a "true" renewal; both cases result in a continuous flow of interest-only
payments, with no reduction in principal).
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Further, the study shows a direct correlation between the loan
amount and the percentage of loans that were consecutive. Not surprisingly, the larger the loan, the more likely it is that the consumer will repeatedly roll it over. See Figure 8.
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44.9%

54.6%

64.7%

68.7%

Figure 8: Proportion of "consecutive" loans by amount.
Importantly, because a "touch and go"-type rollover ostensibly is a
"new" loan, and not a "renewal" subject to the DDLA's one-renewal
limit, a lender can alternate true "renewals" with "rollovers" indefinitely,
ad infinitum. In this way, a lender easily can circumvent the DDLA's
limits on renewals. 110 This lack of regulation over rollovers, together
with the revenues derived from and dependence upon the "repeat" customer, may create an incentive for some less scrupulous payday lenders
to disguise their renewals. That is, they may structure the transaction so
that it in form appears to be a lawful payoff in full of one loan followed
immediately by a new loan, but that in reality is a renewal with no exchange of moneys between the borrower and the lender other than the
borrower's payment of an additional finance charge."'
110.
See, e.g., Fox & MIERZW1NSKI, supra note 17, at 8-9 (state law renewal limits easily
evaded via "touch and go's"); Barr, supra note 17, at 158 (lack of regulation on same-day advances
"leave[s] open a big loophole" to evade renewal limits).
111.
Colorado is no stranger to such disguised renewals. In In Re Kentucky Cash Connection,
LLC, No. CCC 2002-001 (Adm'r Colo. Uniform Consumer Credit Code July 18, 2003) (final
agency order) (on file with Office of the Colo. Att'y Gen.), the Administrator required a payday
lender to surrender its licenses where the Administrator alleged the lender renewed its loans more
than once in violation of the DDLA's one-renewal limit. In that case, two former high-ranking
executives of the lender provided testimony that the lender falsified its records to make it appear as
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Indeed, the study reveals that lenders' continually extending numerous, consecutive loans to consumers - whether by lawfully alternating
"true" renewals with "touch and go" rollovers or otherwise - occurs with
perhaps inordinate frequency. According to the study, 10.16% of all
consumers were continually indebted to the same location being examined every single day of the six months preceding the particular examination. This figure has been rising steadily over time. See Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Proportion of six-month continually indebted customers (at one
location).
Further, as with "repeat" borrowers, these continually-indebted consumers account for a disproportionately large share of the lenders' annual
total loan volume. For example, study-to-date, the six-month continually
indebted consumers represent 20.4% of lenders' total annual loan volume. This figure, too, has risen over time. See Figure 10.
The foregoing data confirm, and are consistent with, results reported
and theories advanced elsewhere. First, despite the DDLA's onerenewal limit, Colorado payday loan consumers are not protected against
the continual cycle of debt, or "debt treadmill," common to the payday

if the unlawful multiple renewals were new, rollover same-day "touch and go" loans. See also
Graves & Petersen, supra note 18, at 92 (citing to and reporting on In Re Kentucky Cash Connection).
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loan industry.1 12 Second, and perhaps of greater concern, is the industry's financial dependence upon the "repeat," "debt trapped" 3consumer;
indeed, this appears to be the industry's very business model. "
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Figure 10: Proportion of total loan volume attributable to six-month continually indebted consumers.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The study's data and analysis expose significant problems in current
Colorado payday loan regulation. These problems are directly traceable
to flaws and shortcomings in the DDLA. However, these flaws easily
are rectified by conceptually simple changes to the statute. In no particular order of priority, I offer some modest proposals.
First, to help combat the problems of "loan splitting" and "steering"
of consumers to particular loan amounts, the DDLA's current "step-rate"
finance charge provision should be eliminated. There should be one, and
only one, maximum allowable finance charge rate, regardless of the size

112. See supra text accompanying note 94.
113. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 11, at 1281 (through continual rollovers, lenders encourage
consumers "to prolong their ride on the "debt treadmill"); Johnson, supra note 2, at 69-71 (because
repeat transactions generate majority of lender revenue, "rollover practice is part of its business
model"); ERNST, supra note 17, at 4-5 (payday loan industry "relies on business model that encourages chronic borrowing.").
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of the loan. This change also would help lenders by simplifying the loan
process and their concomitant finance charge and APR calculations.
Second, to further prevent "loan splitting" and potential circumvention of both the maximum loan amount and renewal limits, the DDLA's
definition of "lender" should be amended to include affiliates or similar
related entities. To illustrate, under the DDLA's current form, one
"head" payday lender might set up a number of ostensibly separate, independent "lender" companies, but which in reality are closely related
and inter-connected "tentacles," such as through common ownership or
management. By using this structure, together with a business model of
shuffling consumers between and among the various "tentacles," the
"head" lender may attempt to circumvent renewal or loan amount limitations. Notably, both Rule 7 and the Committee's draft legislation defined "lender" to include affiliates" 14 and would have prevented this device; this omission from the DDLA should be corrected.
Third, to alleviate the perceived difficulty in enforcing the Code's
current "loan splitting" prohibition, 1 5 the section should be restored to
its pre-1975 version.1 6 In this way, unlawful "loan splitting" would not
be dependent upon a determination of the lender's "purpose" of, but instead would occur where the "result" was in, obtaining a higher finance
charge.
Fourth, the study reveals a gaping disconnect between the theory
and expressed purpose of payday loans, on the one hand, and their reality, on the other. That is, although these loans are intended for one-time,
l8
emergency purposes 1"' - a theory the industry purports to embrace" their reality presents a starkly different picture, one inhabited by consumers repeatedly rolling over their "emergency," "stop-gap" loans. The
DDLA's one-renewal limit has proven ineffective in eliminating the debt
trap common to payday lending. Indeed, the disproportionate contribution the repeat consumer makes to lenders' revenues likely entices lenders to allow, and perhaps encourage, borrowers to obtain numerous, continual consecutive loans. The study shows lenders find this temptation
hard to resist. Because the DDLA does not regulate non-renewal rollovers, it does not discourage lenders from succumbing to this temptation.
Further, because the DDLA does not prevent one payday lender
from extending a payday loan to a consumer to payoff a payday loan due
114.

See supra Parts III-IV.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3-205 (2005); supra Part IIl.
115.
116.
See 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 247 (amending § 5-3-409).
117.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-104 (2005) (requiring lenders to provide notice to consumers that payday loans are not "intended to meet long-term financial needs" but "should be used only
to meet short-term cash needs").
See Freedom of Choice for Consumers, supra note 83 (payday loans are intended for
118.
emergency, "stop-gap" needs). This report goes on to claim that "[dieferred deposit service businesses do not want to do business with customers engaged in excessive rollovers." Id.
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another lender - i.e., the "borrowing from Peter to pay Paul" syndrome it does nothing to cut off the unending debt cycle. Instead, it allows the
cycle to be transferred from one lender to another.
Therefore, the DDLA should be amended to prohibit the practice of
using one payday loan to pay off another. Additionally, it should mandate a "cooling off' period of, say, seven days, between the time one
payday loan is paid off and the time any lender may extend a new payday
loan. To facilitate and make effective these provisions, the DDLA
should provide for the creation of a statewide database, to which all payday lenders must subscribe, containing information on consumers and
their payday loans. 19 Before a lender may extend a payday loan to a
consumer, the lender must verify from the database the consumer's eligibility for a loan.
Fifth, the DDLA currently prohibits any one lender from having
more than $500 in payday loans outstanding to any one consumer at any
one time. 2 ° However, this prohibition does not prevent another lender
from extending another payday loan to the consumer at the same time.
Thus, a consumer could have a number of payday loans outstanding at
any one time from a number of different lenders, with each loan up to the
maximum $500 limit. 121 This exacerbates the debt treadmill problem.
Accordingly, the DDLA's current prohibition should be expanded
so as to prohibit a lender from extending a payday loan to a consumer
who has a payday loan outstanding from any other payday lender. Here,
too, there should be created a statewide database that the lender would be
required to consult in order to verify the consumer's loan eligibility. An
alternative, but more limited, expansion of the prohibition is to prohibit a
lender from extending a payday loan in an amount that would cause the
consumer's aggregate outstanding payday loans, from all lenders, to exceed $500. However, this alternative may defeat the purpose and effectiveness of the cooling off period. For example, this alternative allows
several small loans, whose aggregate amount falls under the cap, to be
extended to one consumer, but whose terms and due dates are staggered.
By staggering the terms, so that the loans overlap, the consumer is never
truly out from under the debt trap of a payday loan.
The sixth recommendation does not derive from the study, but instead from amendments to the DDLA, contained in House Bill (HB) 04-

119.
The concepts of statewide databases and "cooling off' periods are not novel. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 560.404(19) (2005) (24-hour cooling off period); FLA. STAT. § 560.404(23) (2005)
(database); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 122/2-5(b) (2005) (seven day cooling off period); 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 122/2-15 (2005) (database); IND. CODE.§ 24-4.5-7-401(2) (2005) (seven day cooling off
period); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-7-404(4)(b) (2005) (database); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-12(4) (2005)
(three business day cooling off period and database).
120.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-106(1) (2005).
121.
See supranote 103.
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Contained in the Code is the concept and doctrine of "unconscionability.' 23 This doctrine prohibits creditors from making "unconscionable" consumer credit transactions and provides various remedies, in
favor of both consumers and the Administrator, in the event a court determines a transaction is "unconscionable."'' 24 One factor a court is to
consider in making this determination is whether, at the time the transaction was made, the creditor had a reasonable belief that the25 consumer had
the ability to repay the transaction according to its terms.1
In 2002, the Administrator issued an advisory opinion letter concerning "unconscionability" and its incorporated "ability to repay" requirement.1 26 Specifically, she reminded payday lenders that this doctrine applied to them and their loans to the same extent as it applied to
any other lender or any other consumer credit transaction.' 27 She stated
that, under the doctrine, the Code "obligates a responsible lender to inquire about a consumer's repayment ability whenever a loan is made,"
which "logically ... includes reviewing" the consumer's assets and income versus his or her liabilities.1 28 She observed that it was the practice
of some payday lenders not to perform such typical loan underwriting
diligence and not to inquire into such things as the consumer's income or
credit worthiness.12 9 She advised that payday lenders, who did not verify
a consumer's "ability to repay," ran substantial risks that their loans
might be declared unconscionable and "strongly discouraged" such practices. 30
Payday lenders, through their industry trade associations,' 3' objected to what they perceived as the Administrator's imposition of unreasonable burdens on their lending practices. 132 In response to these objections, and the lenders' requests for specific guidance as to what may or
may not be "unconscionable" practices, in 2003 the Administrator issued
a revised opinion letter. 133 Although she acknowledged that (1) the un122.
See 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 317-21 (enacting HB 04-1069).
123.
See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-5-109, 5-6-112 (2005).
124.
See id.
125.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-6-112(3)(a) (2005).
126.
See Admin. Opinion Letter, "Reasonable Probability of Payment in Full and Record
Retention" (Adm'r Colo. Consumer Credit Code Dec. 2, 2002), at 1 (on file with Office of the Colo.
Att'y Gen.).
127.
Id. at 1.
128.
Id. at2.
129.
Id.at 1,2.
130.
Id. at 2.
131.
Specifically, the CFSA and the Colorado Check Holders Association. See Admin. Opinion Letter, "Reasonable Probability of Payment in Full and Record Retention - Revised" (Adm'r
Colo. Consumer Credit Code June 16, 2003), at 1, http://www.ago.state.co.us (on file with Office of
the Colo. Att'y Gen.).
See id. at 1.
132.
133. See id.
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conscionability doctrine required flexibility in its application and depended upon a factual review of the transaction, and (2) she was statutorily prohibited from promulgating rules or regulations on unconscionability, she acceded to the payday lenders' requests by adopting enforcement
policy guidelines and enumerating certain recommended practices that, if
followed, would not result in the taking of any administrative enforcement action based upon a consumer's repayment ability (absent a complaint or specific evidence of inability to repay). 134 These guidelines
covered such things as (1) the frequency with which a payday lender
should obtain a new loan application and verify consumer income and
employment, (2) minimum loan-to-income ratios, and (3) minimum loan
terms and the scheduling of a payday loan's due
date so as to coincide
135
with or come after the consumer's next payday.
Apparently, payday lenders remained unsatisfied. Accordingly,
during the 2004 legislative session they pushed for and were the moving
force behind HB 04-1069.136 With the bill's passage, the industry might
lay claim to have obtained three significant benefits.
First, the industry may claim the bill all but removes entirely the
"ability to repay" concept from the Code's unconscionability doctrine for
payday loans, save for minimal loan-to-income ratios and income verification requirements. 137 Thus, payday lenders might say they received
legislative imprimatur allowing them to ignore basic loan underwriting
diligence required of any other creditor to avoid having a transaction
declared unconscionable.
Second, were this not enough, through the bill payday lenders
sought to weaken further the "unconscionability" doctrine vis-d-vis payday loans by adding factors a court is to consider in making this determination. 138 These factors include weighing (1) the benefits of the loan to
the consumer versus the lender's risk; (2) the absence of collateral other
than the consumer's instrument; and (3) the 1relation
between the amount
39
of the payday loan and the cost in making it.
On their face, these factors perhaps are not neutral but instead might
be seen to be skewed heavily in favor of the payday lender. For example, the industry claims that (1) payday loans serve an essential consumer
134. See id. at 2-5.
135. See id. at 3-4. The Administrator also made special mention of the "cycle of debt." She
observed that some payday lenders' practices of allowing consumers to continually roll over their
loans via a same day, "touch and go" new loan raised questions concerning the consumer's ability to
repay the loan according to its scheduled terms. See id. at 4. One possible solution she advanced to
address this concern was the concept of a central database. See id.
136. Of the industry's trade associations, it is significant that only the Colorado Check Holders
Association spoke on the bill's behalf; in particular, neither the CFSA nor FiSCA publicly supported
it. See supranote 83 (describing CFSA and FiSCA).
137. See 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 320 (enacting COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.1-122(2) and (3)).
138. See id. (enacting COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-122(1)).
139. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-122(l)(a)-(c) (2005).
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need not met by conventional sources of credit; (2) the fixed transaction
costs associated with payday lending are significant in relation to the size
of the loan and disproportionately higher than in conventional lending;
(3) payday lenders' risks are higher than conventional lenders' risks; and
(4) the benefits to the consumer of obtaining a loan far outweigh the alternatives and include such things as enhancing financial standing, avoiding the incurring of returned check charges, and not having to pledge
tangible collateral as would be required in a comparable pawn transaction. 140 Further, these factors simultaneously (1) deprive payday loan
consumers of protections to which all other borrowers are entitled under;
and (2) give payday lenders anti-competitive advantages over all other
creditors subject to; the Code.
Importantly, because it seemingly substantially eviscerates the "unconscionabilty" doctrine as applied to payday loans, HB 04-1069 may
further aggravate the "debt cycle" problem. 141 That is, lenders who continually and repeatedly roll over their loans, and extend to consumers
numerous consecutive loans, likely are unconcerned with whether a loan
would be repaid according to its terms. Yet this practice would seem to
be unconscionable on its face - such lenders cannot harbor a "reasonable
belief' that the consumer would repay the loan as scheduled. 142 Further,
because (1) as the study shows this practice accounts for the majority of
lenders' revenues; 43 and (2) the DDLA currently does not prohibit the
practice of repeatedly alternating renewals with rollovers, ad infinitum,
HB 04-1069 potentially weakens a significant, and perhaps the only,
deterrent against this practice and thereby encourages lenders to engage
in it with apparent impunity.
Third, the bill provides payday lenders with special substantive and
procedural protections, along with immunity from certain types of administrative discipline, in the event of administrative disciplinary proceedings arising out of violations of the Code.' 44 These include such
things as providing payday lenders with a limited "bona fide error" defense, allowing them a limited "right to cure," and giving them a ninetyday time period within which to comply with administrative rules, interpretations, or opinions. 45 Here, too, these special privileges apply only
to payday lenders; no other supervised lender is accorded such status.

140.
See Freedom of Choice for Consumers, supranote 83.
141.
Whether this was an intended or unintended consequence of the bill is not known.
142.
See Bruch, supra note 11, at 1280-82; see also, e.g., id. at 1278-80 (describing how payday loans are otherwise unconscionable); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 7.5.5.6, at 301-02
(same).
143.
See supra Part VL.E.
144.
See 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 319-20 (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-118 by adding
subsections (2)(c) and (3)).
145.
Id.

2005]

BORROWING FROMPETER TO PAY PAUL

HB 04-1069 is an example of special interest legislation. However,
the legislation seems ill-advised. It must be remembered that payday
lenders are allowed to make the most expensive, highest cost loans in
Colorado, exceeding by several orders of magnitude Colorado's 45%
criminal usury rate. 146 Further, payday lenders' clientele, by reason of
their desperate financial circumstances, likely are the most vulnerable of
borrowers and most in need of the Code's consumer protections. Yet,
HB 04-1069 perhaps (1) deprives payday loan consumers of fundamental
consumer protections to which all other borrowers are entitled; and (2)
accords special treatment and privileges to payday lenders by: (a) carving
out exemptions from Code provisions of general applicability; and (b)
creating special procedural and substantive protections unavailable to
any other creditor. This makes HB 04-1069 simultaneously both anticompetitive and anti-consumer protective. To restore a proper balance
between the legitimate needs of payday lenders and their consumers,
those aspects of HB 04-1069 that provide special privileges and protections to payday lenders should be repealed in their entirety. This includes the bill's provisions relating to the doctrine of "unconscionability"
to ensure that the doctrine retains its full vigor and applicability to payday loans as it does to any other extension of credit.
CONCLUSION

Whether payday lending should be legal in Colorado is a debate that
is beyond the scope of this article. For now, the General Assembly has
concluded that it should be, albeit subject to and under the DDLA's regulation. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that payday lending is but
the modem incarnation of what in earlier eras was outlawed and condemned as usurious loan sharking. Given its unsavory ancestry, the significant potential for abuse, and the devastating consequences of such
abuse, payday lending demands the strictest of regulation and closest of
scrutiny.

146.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-104(1) (2005).

